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NASA RESEARCH BEARING ON JET ENGINE RELIABILITY 
INTRODUCTION 
Turbojet engine reliability has long been an intense interest to the 
military users of this type of aircraft propulsion. With the recent inauguration 
of commercial jet transport this subject has assumed a new dimension of importance. 
In January l96 the Lewis Research Center of the NASA (then the MACA) 
published the results of an extensive study on the factors that affect the opera-
• tional reliability of turbojet engines (ref. 1). At that time the report was 
classified Confidential. In July l98 this report was declassified. It is thus 
appropriate at this time to present some of the highlights of the studies describ-
ed in the NASA report. In no way is it intended to outline the complete contents 
of the report; rather it is hoped to direct attention to it among those who are 
• directly concerned with this problem. 
Since the publication of our study over three years ago, the NASA has 
completed a number of additional investigations that bear significantly on this 
•	 subject. A second object of this paper, therefore, is to summarize the results 
of these recent studies and to interpret their significance in relation to tur-
bojet operational reliability. 
• A third objective is to indicate several further needs -- design infor-
mation, operational principles, and inspection and maintenance procedures -- that 
would lead to greater engine reliability. The unique opportunity afforded by the 
invitation of a new industry-- starting as it is with a new crop of engines and 
with a need for long life and utmost reliability -- to provide information of im-
mediate use and which'will help in the design of future generations of engines 
should not be overlooked. 
In discussing the problem of jet engine reliability it is important to 
recognize important differences between the characteristics of this type of engine 
and those of the piston engine which it replaces. The concept of limited life is 
familiar to most engineering and maintenance personnel concerned with aircraft; 
but in most cases this concept relates only to rubbing contact wear and to fatigue 
at approximately room teinpeçature. The severe limitations on life imposed by op-
eration at high temperature is a new concept that must be superimposed when con-
sidering 1 jet engine life. Not only does this factor'have a ,
 profound effect on 
policieó aà to when and how to inspect for failures, but it also governs part re-
placement policy and the amount and type of records that must me%culously be kept 
if continuing maintenance of an engine is to be 'rational. Another difference re-
lates to the sensitivity toward environment of the two type of engines.' Foreign 
'object damage, for example, is an unheard-of factor in the reciprocating engine, 
but one of the principal causes of failure in turbojet engines. The approach to 
an understanding of jet engine reliability must therefore begin with an acceptance 
that the differences between the two types of engine will entail a reorientation 
of the thinking of the design operation and maintenance personnel, carrying over 
only those ideas that are of proven pertinence. We must start afresh, determining 
what parts fail, why, and what can be done.about'
 it. 
The first step in our study was to examine the data on component fail-
ures 'compiled by the' military services. These data served to indicate the, com-
ponents that were the principal sources of difficulty, indicated whether compo-
nentfailurewee ."tirne-dependent, and gave some 1ndicationof the times to 
t•)
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failure of these components. Of course, any one particular engine may be quite 
different from those that were studied but the study of several served to deline-
ate the average characteristics of the problems. 
A review was then made of the theory and experimental infonnation on 
the failure mechanisms of the important components obtained from NASA research 
and the literature. On the basis of this information, an attempt was made to 
discuss methods of avoiding failures, particularly those failures that could 
cause flight accidents. 
The various failures were examined to reveal the causes of the failure, 
the speed with which the failure progressed from first indication of failure to 
final failure, and the effect of the failure of the component on the engine. 
Methods of avoiding the causes of failure were then explored. When the 
failure causes could not be eliminated then the methods of avoiding accident in 
flight were explored. These methods involve scheduled inspections, scheduled re-
placements and warning devices. 
Although the discussion in this report will emphasize primarily the con-
tributions of NASA to this subject, mention will in several cases be made to devel-
opments of other organizations. While no attempt will be made to be complete in 
any area, certain outside contributions naturally fall into consideration while 
• outlining the NASA studies.
/ 
We are indebted for the statistical data and valuable discussion to per-
sonnel in Wright Air Development Center, Air Materiel Command, Oklahoma City Air 
Materiel Area, Directorate of Flight Safety, Bureau of Aeronautics, and the air-
craft engine industries.
STATISTICAL STUDY 
It is very difficult to obtain a clear picture of the service life re-
cord to data of the turbojçt engine from available published information. This 
• is true, in part, because quoted statistics are based on overhaul records which, 
as we sh1all see, can sometimes have less significance than might be expected. It 
• may alsO be due to the limited viewpoint involved in the quotations which may lead 
- both to unusually high life or to unusually low values. In some,scases a high 
service life of a single engine or, at most, several engines may -be quoted. This 
life may not, however, be representative of the average engine. In other cases, 
high figures may be given which are specifications of maximum operating times for 
military engines which is the time when an engine must go to overhaul. The number 
of engines which complete such a service record without being sent prematurely to 
• overhaul may be very small. 	 - 
On the other hand unusually low figures may refer only to the average 
of the lives of these engines in overhaul without regard to the many engines in 
service that have not yet required overhaul. This can be illustrated by an ex-
treme example. Assume that 100 engines are initially placed in service and after 
10 hours one deficient engine requires overhaul. Examination of the average life 
of the engines in overhaul would indicate a figure of 10 hours.' But, this ignores 
the other, 99 engines which might operate for hundreds oi hours before coming to 
overhaul. ' It is only after all the enginesinitially placed in service have come 
()
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to overhaul that the average life can be determined. Since available statistics 
do not usually include information on the engines not yet in overhaul, it is ob-
vious that the mean life of those engines in overhaul is not a particularly mean-
ingful figure. To avoid misrepresentations of this type, the Air Force has recent-
ly adopted what they call the Actuarial Method by which the operating times on all 
the engines in service are statistically accounted for. 
Probably, however, the most important misleading factor is that statis-
tics may be based on overhaul records without regard for the field repair program 
• employed by the Air Force. to minimize costs and engine out-time. The present 
practice is to permit all hot parts in most engines to be replaced at the operat-
ing base without sending the engine to overhaul. Even axial' flow compressors can 
be reworked at the operating base, but as a nile they can be disassembled only in 
óverhàul. Since a field repair may involve anything up to and including replace-
rnents of turbine blades, turbine disks, nozzle diaphragms, burners, etc'., It is 
obvious that the field repairs cannot be ignored in considering overhaul statis-
tics.
In order, therefore, to obtain a reasonably representative picture of 
service reliability,, one 'must consider both the field repair program and the ov-
. erhaul records.' Fig. 1 shows some results obtained in reference 1, but which 
have been brought up to date by very recently obtained statistics. The engines 
and aircraft have, however, been coded for proprietary reasons. The lengths of 
the solid bars represent the median times to overhaul (So% of the' engines go to 
overhaul by the median time). It is seen that the time to overhaul of the av-
eráge jet engine is generally,
 between 320 and 1120 hours.. One engine has a medi
-
an overhaul time of 2S00 hours, but as will soon be seen it is particularly im-
'portant that the interpretation of this figure include consideration of the field 
repair program for this engine. Also shown in the figure are the overhaul statis- " 
tics for military reciprocating engines. The overhaul times lie between ).6O hours 
and 1b20 hours, with most of them above 700 hours. 
The extent of the field repair program is shown in Fig. 1 by the dotted 
lines which represent the median times to first removal for each airplane-engine 
combination. The 'repair is frequently made at an operating base, and does not 
count as an overhaul. 'The figures are now seen to be considerably lower. An out-
standing example of the infuencé of the field repair program on time to overhaul 
is the case of the C7 engine in the Ti airplane shown twice in the figure. In 
one case jâ.norrnal number of field repairs are being accomplished in the field and 
the average engine, goes to , overhaul in L8o hours. In the second case the air-
planes are being 'used by a command that is making an "all out" effort to accomp-
lish replacements at the operating base. The engine then naturally exhibits a 
high overhaul time of 2S00 hours but the time' for first removal of the average 
engine is about the, same, 200 hours. 
Fig. 2 shows the number of removals per major overhaul. For the engine 
cited above the low overhaul time group of engines corresponds to a removal rate 
of 2 .1., whereas the 'engines with the,,
 long overhaul times have a removal rate of 
12.S. Also shown In this figure are "the, ratios of removal rates (the number ' of 
removals not including overhauls to removals, for ,
 overhaul) for reciprocating en-
gines These are seen to be low 
It should be pointed out that the above discussion is not intended to 
indicate that available military records on times to overhaul are misleading 
The difficulty arises because of the difference in Intent between the development
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of military records and their quotation for other reasons. Military records of 
overhaul times are developed for logistic reasons -- so that the proper number 
of engines will be purchased which will compensate for engine disuse during 
transportation to and time spent at overhaul. For their purpose, the records 
are quite correct and very useful. For any other use, caution should be urged. 
Fig. 3 shows the principal components which are judged by the inspec-
tor at the disassembly base to be the principal reason for engine overhaul. 
These particular data were obtained during our l9SS study and do not reflect 
experience with more recently designed engines which we have not had the oppor-
	 -, 
• tunity to review. The component is shown in the diagrammatic sketch above. Con-
• siderable spread was obtained in these statistics when considering different en-
gines. The height of the shaded area represents the spread between the results 
'among several engineà. Thus,, for all factors other than foreign object damage, 
the shaded area goes down to the axis indicating that in some of these engines 
no overhaul could be attributed to these components. ' By far, the most important 
reason for overhaul was foreign objects. 
Experience hs indicated that, whenever an engine is disassembled either 
in the field or in overhaul, a large number of component failures will be found al-
though the cause for overhaul may be attributed to failure of only one of these 
components. Fig. Ii shows a sample of our findings on the part replacements made 
during major overhaul. It is seen, for example, that in one engine type 60% of 
the engines required burner component replacement during overhaul. In another en-
gine, over 80% of the turbine sections required replacements. 
The above statistics, while appearing somewhat pessimistic, should not 
be interpreted to imply that identical experience will be encountered in cornmer-
'cial application. It must be recognized that the military application is quite 
different from its commercial counterpart, both'asto nature Of service and a to 
factori that govern engine removal. However, it '
 should serve as an indication 
that the factors which causesuch removal must be determined and practiôes sought' 
out which will reduce them to a minimum. Some of these factors will be discussed' 
,in this report, others will become more evident as experience is accumulated. 
.qb
MECHANISMS OF FAILURE 
The statistics indicated the frequency of component failure; however, 
little insight was provided on the reason for failure and the mechanisminvolved, 
Based on a study of failure mechanisms in test engines at the Lewis Research Cen-
ter, an analysis could be made of the probable causes of the failur8s encountered 
in service. In the remainder of this discussion failure mechanisms which were ob-
served will be outlined. These are listed in Fig. . 
Underde sign and Defect's of Materials and Manufacture 
In an effort to obtain engines of low weight per unit thrust, compo-
nents are designed with small margins of safety. Failures are thus usually expe-
rienced in early models, but are generally eliminated by improvements in design 
and manufacturing methods. A large percentage of the failures revealed In our 
statistical study were of the type that could be corrected b . improved design ' - 
by eliminating defective materials, 'or ,
 Improving heat. treatments, and by improved 
practices In forging, welding or other manufacturing methods. We did not there-
fore concern ourselves with these'.types of failures.
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An important engine component charged with a large percentage of en-
gine overhauls is the fuel control. The largest percentage of fuel control dif-
• ficul'ty is due to a failure of a component within the control rather than Inade-
quacy of the control method. No fundamental obstacle to elimination of thesede-
fects is apparent; however, a large amount of development time is required on any 
given control because of its large number of components. Defect elimination is 
hampered by the fact that control designs were changing rapidly at the time of 
our investigation. Improvement in the reliability of this component would great-
ly Improve the reliability of jet engines. 
Creep and Stress Rupture 
	
•	 .A large percentage of the failures in the jet engine parts are due to 
high temperatures at which the engine operates. One of the failure mechanisms is 
creep and stress rupture. When a material is subjected to a steady load at ele-
vated temperatures, it is found to elongate continuously with time, this being 
•	 known as ttcreepn; and after a certain period of time rupture occurs, this being 
known as "stress rupture". The life of a material in a stress rupture test is 
very critically affected by stress and temperature as indicated in Fig. 6. Here 
is plotted, for a coimnon high temperature alloy -- S-816, the rupture time or 
• life as a function of the temperature for a stress of 15,000 psi. The slope of 
the curve is such that an increase in temperature of ' cuts the life by a fac-
tor of 10, and correspondingly a decrease in temperature by 5% would increase 
• . the life by a factor of 10. Thus, we see why small temperature changes can so 
	
• ••	 drastically affect the life of turbine buckets and turbine disks which are under 
•	 the action of steady centrifugal stress during operation. Likewise a small in-
crease in stress can have a large effect on the life. For one engine, a 5% in- 	 / 
crease in engine speed, main1aining the temperature, results In a change of 
• stress rupture life .inthe turbine bucket of about a factor of 3. Thus, stress 
...and temperature must carefully be controlled in such components as turbine buck-
ets and turbine disks. 
Fig. 7 illustrates a plot of method used to determine the maximum life 
that can be sustained by a"turbine bucket. The stress and the temperature along 
the bucket are plotted, and, from stress rupture curves such as shown before, the 
life of each section of the bucket can be computed. At the base, the life is 
high althOugh the stress ishigh because of the low temperature. At the tip, the 
life is again high although the temperature is high because the stress Is low. 
Approximtély midway between the base and the tip the combination of stress and 
temperature is such to produce minimum life. This is the section where the fail-
ure occurs when the failure is of the stress-rupture type. Thi&iinimum stress 
rupture life varies widely among engines of different design from less than 1000 
hours to 30,000 hours. 
Rarely, however, does the life of the bucket achieve its stress rupture 
value. Other factors, such as fatigue, both mechanical and thermal, usually re-
duce the life to values well below the stress rupture value. Designing for a 
high stress rupture life, however, increases considerably the margin of safety 
available for other incidental factors... 
One of the problems In connection with stress rupture failure Is the 
variability, in life of presumably identical components. Stress-rupture data 
usually show considerable scatter and turbinebuckete which are subjected to 
- the :mechanism,,of stress rupture will likewise show considerable scatter In.
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life. Fig. 8 shows the results of an investigation (ref. 2) to determine the.. 
lives of I6 buckets placed in one wheel. The wheel was operated until the 
first bucket failed. This bucket was replaced and the wheel operated again 
until other buckets failed, each blade failure was replaced by new buckets un-
til each of the original 6 buckets had failed. The life of the first bucket 
was inthe.neighborhood of 180 hours; the last bucket to fail lasted almost 600 
hours. This spread in life is typical of what happens in jet. engines and from 
an operating standpoint illustrates an important principle regarding bucket re-
placement. This wheel showed a grace time of 180 hours and a set of new buckets 
could reasonably be expected to operate for close to this period of time without---
any failures. However, if upon the failure of the first bucke .t only this bucket-
- is replaced, we . can expect the next failure to take place after 10 hours and the 
next shortly afterwards. This shows the inadvisability of replacing turbine 
buckets one by one as they fail if the mechanism of failure is stress rupture. 
When blades begin to fail by stress rupture, the turbine should be rebucketed 
completely. It is true that a large number of useful bucket hours are lost by 
such bucket replacement, but no method has yet been found to distinguish in ad- - 
vance between the bucket that will last 200 hours and the one that will last 600 
hours. This figure also points up an important factor regarding replacement 
practice for turbine buckets during overhaul. If, for. example, an inspection 
period had been set at lSO hours, the first inspection would have shown no fail-
ures. By the next inspection period of 300 hours almost half the buckets would 
-have failed. A replacement schedule for, time-dependent failures must be based, 
therefore, not only on the appearance of the part during inspection or overhaul, 
but on experimentally determined life expectancy. 	 . 
Another important point in connection with creep and stress rupture. of 
- turbine buckets is that the creep is highly localized because of the variation 
- of stress and temperature shown in one of the previous figures.. Fig. 9 shows the 
measured local elongations at various points in a turbine bucket after 9 hours 
- and'.after 28 hours of operation. (This example uses a weak alloy and thus total 
operating times are very short.) Note, that at the section involving the criti-
cal combination of stress-and temperature the local elongation may be as high as 
8. The over-all elongation is still low because of.. the lower elongations in 
other locations of the bucket. Thus, the use of the creep of a turbine bucket 
to warn us of impending failure (e.g., as indicated by. rubbing of the squealer 
tips) is1 not completely practical. The buckets fail with an apparent low over-
all elongation because the high strain is localized. 
In the case of the turbine disk, creep and stress rupture can occur in 
the bucket fastening region and in some cases in the hub itself. Fig. 10 shows 
an unusual case of disk growth due to creep. In this case the creep was quite 
localized and most of the necking took place in the welded area between the hub 
•	 and the rim regions. The problem in the case of disks can be very serious when 
the disk temperature is controlled by a cooling system (as.is. the usualy practice) 
and when this cooling system fai1s. Fig. 11 shows a photograph of a disk which 
burst as a result of excessive creep-due to failure of the cooling system. In 
this case the cooling air baffles became-warped and directed hot.gas instead of 
cool air onto the disk. 	 .	 .	 . 
When the principal failure is one of stress rapture, • several obvious 
remedial measures can- be applied. . Lowering the stress or the temperature can, 
as previously indicated, greatly increase stress-rupture life. Thus, a slight 
derating of the engine may in some cases be possible which result in large.
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increase in stress-rupture life. In a study of one engine, for example, it was 
found that, if the temperature was decreased 100°F and the speed reduced 1%, the 
increase 'in the computed stress-rupture life in the turbine bucket was a factor 
of W.. A 6% loss in thrust was involved, but because of the greater efficiency 
a t% decrease in specific fuel consumption could be realized. Careful attention 
must be paid to the details of the cooling system to insure its proper function
-
ing. Warning devices to indicate when it is not functioning properly would be 
extremely helpful in avoiding failure. Likewise a systematic schedule of part 
replacements could be of great value in avoiding engine failure when the failure 
mechanism is stress rupture. The replacement schedule should be based on labora-
tory and engine test data; and should allow for the scatter in material proper-
ties and in severity of service history-. 
Since strss-rupture failures usually occur with little prior warning, 
and 'since the failure of a disk or of a turbine bucket, especially in the' case of 
a multistage turbine can result in catastrophic failure of the,engine, stress-
rupture failure must be avoided. Preferably, the design stresses should be kept 
so low that the theoretical life is well beyond the expected use time of the corn-
ponent. This would allow, in addition, a margin for simultaneous mechanisms of 
deterioration such as mechanical and thermal fatigue. If, however, the press for 
high' performance forces operation in a stress-rupture range of limited life, then 
'. : the operator must'be prepared to protect the engine by a replacement schedule. 
Mechanical Fatigue
/ 
Another mechanism that serverely- affects the life of jet engine compo-
- nents is mechanical fatigue. Turbine buckets, compressor blades, the fastening

region of'.the disk, 'the balls and races of thrust bearings, and various sheet 
• metal parts were found susceptible to failure by fatigue. Fig. 12 shows typical 
r: failures in a turbine bucket. When the failure is one of stress rupture, the
	 '
failure cross section is rough and the failure path is in the crystal boundaries. 
'(See top example in Fig. i2.) When the mechanism is one of fatigue, we usually 
have the familiar concentric rings and a smooth section where the failure is in-
• itiated. When fatigue has reduced the cross sectional area so , that it can no 
": longer sustain the load, failure usually occurs by stress rupture. This is il-
lustrated by the middle pictures in Fig. 12, The lower pictures illustrate a 
• case in which stress rupture initiated a crack which In turn acted as a stress 
raiser fo'rultimate failure by fatigue. 
•	 '	 '	 ' 
Fig. 13 shows typical fatigue failures in the compressor. The origin 
of failure usually occurs at the maximum camber point where ,
 the vibratory '
 stresses 
are the highest. When foreign objects pass through the engine, they may nick the 
compressor blades Introducing a stress concentration, usually in the leading edge 
thereby inducing subsequent 'fatigue failures. Stress corrosion cracks may also 
act as nuclei for fatigue. When the stresses are high in the fastening section, 
the fatigue may occur across the neck of one of the serrations. 
Fig. it shows typical fatigue ' failures in bearing raceway-s. 'In the 
case of the'bearings and the raceways, the highest shear stresses usually occur 
slightly beneath the surface and the failure Initiates in this region. As the 
'failure progresses outward it releases a section of metal producing a pit. 
Later stages produce flaking. 
'Some Of the components In thejet'engIne suchasthe compressorfatigue 
• at 1owoi moderate temperature, 'while .:other components such' as' the turbine bucket 
,'	 '	 ' •,''	 ,	 ••,	 ••	 ••	 •••	 ,	 ' ' ' • 	 ' ' .••, ••	 ••	 '	 *	 ,	 .•	 '	
•;.*,•* 
L
fatigue at an elevated temperature. In cases involving high temperature fatigue, 
it appears that in many cases we cannot even count on such a thing as an endurance 
limit, a stress below which the material can withstand an indefinite number of 
cycles without failing. Fig. iS shows some tests run on a high temperature alloy 
N-lSS. In the upper part of the figure is shown the room temperature fatigue 
curve, the number of cycles to failure as a function of the alternating stress. 
Any stress below 52,000. psi could be endured indefinitely. At 13S0'F, no. endur-, 
ance limit was encountered even up to i0 8
 cycles. 
Another important characteristic of the jet engine is that in those 
cases involving mechanical fatigue the number of cycles that are accumulated is 
very high even within small operating times in the engine. For example, a tur-
.bine bucket vibrating in one of its complex modes at 10,000 cycles per second 
accumulates lO cycles in less than 18 minutes. A typical raceway in a thrust 
bearing is subjected to alternating stress at a rate of 2LOO cycles per second. 
and accumulates ten million cycles in 70 minutes. . 
A number of remedial measures are possible when the failure mechanism. 
is fatigue. Often an improvement in material quality will solve the problem. 
-Fig. 16 shows how the life of thrust bearings could be improved by an increase 
1in the quality of SAE 52100 steel of which it is made. The circles, show the re-
sults.of fatigue tests conducted in the early 1920's, and the square, the results 
of fatigue tests conducted in the late l9tO's. The composition of the steel was, 
in both cases, the same. The cleanliness of the steel had, however, improved in 
the twenty year development period. The increase in life here is by a factor of
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The problem of material cleanliness is especially important in bearings 
at the present time when consideration is being directed to the use of higher tern-
peraturés at which SAE 52100 steel becomes too soft to be serviceable. Molybdenum 
base tool steels show promise for high temperature bearings because of their di-
mensional stability and high,hardness over a wide temperature range. Early fatigue 
results with these materials were, however, quite disappointing; the room tempera-
ture life obtained with tool steel bearings was generally a fraction of that of 
SAE 52100 bearings. . In addition, the life of tool steel bearings lubricated with 
synthetic oils decreased at Filgh temperature (.ref. 3). The development of very 
clean heats of tool steels by consumable electrode vacuum melting has produced 
bearings with a high temperature fatigue life comparable to that of SAE . 52100 at 
room temperature. Fig. 17 shows a plot of fatigue tests conducted.,.on consumable 
electrode vacuum melt M-SO bearings at IS0F and a typical SAE 52100 room temper-. 
'ature fatigue curve (data from ref. 3). The two curves ähow comparable fatigue
	
lives.	 . .	 .	 . 
	
.	
Another obvious remedial measure when fatigue is the failure'mechanism 
is to reduce the exciting force causing the alternating stress. In the case of 
thrust bearings, the load can be reduced by distributing the thrust amáng several 
bearings. The life can be greatly increased by small reductions In load since 
the fatigue life varies as the reclprocai-of the cube of theload. 
In the case of the turbine buckets, the vibratory force can be reduced 
in several ways, such as by the proper spacing between the nozzle and the turbine 
wheel, changing from multiple to annular combustors, or avoiding operating speeds 
that cause resonant vibration. It has also been found (ref. 1) that judiciously 
'arranging the nozzle vanes eo that the space between them are not all equal re-
duces the exciting force.. The complete report . (refe )). on- this latter investiga-
tion which demonstrates the method has only recently been Issued. Fig.' 18(a).
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shows the principle involved. In the standard nozzle diaphragm (shown in: the 
figure as having 15 vanes, but actually having )8 vanes in the . system'investigat-
ed), the spacings are all equal. The rotating turbine buckets are thus.subjected,, 
to regular impulses )8 times .per revolution, and resonance of this exciting force 
with one of the many complex vibrational modes of the bucket can cause large vi-
brations. . If the impulses arebrokén up the exciting forces can be reduced. A 
very desirable and yet practical arrangement is shown in which the 1i8 nozzles are' 
divided into 3 sections, with one section having approximately 10% larger spacing' 
than the average, and one section 10% smaller spacing. In addition.a small dis-
placement (phasing) between the sections was found desirable. tn Fig. .18(b) are 
shown the relative exciting forces for harmonics . of excitation for various.selec.-. 
tions of nozzle vane spacing. The comparison is made with the single exciting 
force of the L8th order which would result if the b8 vanes were equally spaced'. 
and which would appear as a relative excitation force . of unity.. Owing to .the 
non-uniform spacing not only the )8th order appears but many. other harmonics in; 
the vicinity of L48. At a spacing of approximately 8.5% (i.e., 8.5% greater in'. 
one of the three segments, 8.5% smaller in another) the over-all, excitation is .. 
the lowest and represents only approximately 1/3 the excitation of the uniformly, 
spaced nozzle assembly. Thus, such an arrangement should prove., promising, where 
turbine bucket excitation by gas passage through the nozzle vanes .is..a problem. 
In the case of compressor blades, the principa1..vibration.'.exciting 
force is rotating stall. This is illustrated in Fig. 19 which shows :that under' 
certain conditions, usually at part rated speed,. the inlet..air is.not.a.,smooth.. 
continuous medium, but rather is broken up into a number of deadzones. . These 
stall zones rotate relative to:the compressor blades and act effeàtively as ham-. 
mer blows. When the frequencyof these hammer blows coincide..with .the. natural.
	
' / frequency of the blade; large vibrations are induced. This subject'has .been un-
der intensive study at the Lewis Research Center of the NL8LSA. There are a.,number'. 
of remedial measures possible to reduce this exciting force .. due to rotating :stall, 
f or example,. by providing an annular blocking baffle at the compressor inlet .dur-
ing part speed operation which is retracted at 'full speed operation,. or:.by pro-'-
viding compressor bleed during part 'speed operation or by variable 'area :,guide; 
vanes. The, use of two-spool engine.s is also an approach toward minimizing the.'..: 
occurrence. of rotating stall excitation at part speed conditions. . 
Nany MACA investigations (e.g., ref s. 5 to 13) have . been directed at 
obtaining n'understanding of rotating stall, its effect on vibration,, and its 
mitigation. At the present time most engines incorporate design f . tures which: 
are favorable in minimizing this phenomenon. . However, it would .'appear reasona-
ble to expect all models of operational engines toundergo extensive : strain gage' 
vibration studies of the type used'in reference 6 before it is.adopted for'final. 
use. ' Since this phenomenon is very sensitive to many conditions --angle of at-
tack, inlet distortion, temperature, manufacturing tolerances, etc. .-- all these..:: 
conditions should be investigated. 
Both in the compressor and 'the,
 turbine blades, the vibratory stresses. 
can be reduced appreciably by increasing 'the damping. This damping. 'may be in 
the form of internal damping or it may be external by the use of special devices, 
some of which have been Investigated at the MACA (ref. hi).., 
A recent'investigation of combustor liners (ref. 15) has :.found vibra-
tion to be an important factor in these components together 'with thermal stress.. 
In the particular engine studied, the vibration was 'induced 'by, irregularities:in' 
air flow due. to, .the spacing of the last two rotor stages of 'the. axial. flow corn-
pressor. : It is' possible,. therefore, that consideration' should: 'be' given 'to 'designs
- 10 - 
involving unequal spacing and phasing of these blades as a means of minimizing 
this excitation. 
Since ' the fat'igue failure of a thrust bearing, of a compressor blade, 
or of a turbine bucket (especially in the case of a multistage turbine) can 
start a chain reaction leading to engine destruction, it is imperative that fa-
tigue failures of these components be avoided. Since cycles accumulate rapidly, 
and a fatigue failure does not always provide a warning before it 'is too late, 
the only recourse Is to reduce the vibratory stress level to a safe value by de-' 
sign and material selection. If a saôrifice in performance is involved, this 
• sacrifice must be accepted if reliability is the prime criterion. 
Thermal Distortion and Thermal Fatigue 
Thermal stresses associated with high temperature gradients have been 
• found to be a. leading factor in causing jet engine component deterioration. For 
some components, the high temperature gradients occur in steady state operation; 
in other components, it Is only in the transient conditions that high temperature 
•	 gradients occur. Fig. 20 shows the conditions of operation in a typical turbine 
disk. The temperature in the disk Is plotted as a function of the. radius, both 
at the rated condition and in the transient condition. Five minutes after start-
ing the engine, difference between the temperature at the center and at the rim 
was the greatest. At rated conditions, the AT was 60'F and in the transient 
condition an 850'F differential existed between the rim and center. Thus, the 
rim tends to expand much more than the center, but is prevented from the expan-
sion.by. the huskier center region. The result is that under operation the disk 
is at very high compressive stress, usually higher than its elastic limit and 
• compressive plastic flow occurs. Upon return to room temperature, the rim which 
was shortened by the compressive plastic flow now goes into a state of residual 
tensile stress. Alternate cycling frequently results in a condition of rim crack-
• ing' shown in Fig. 21. Note the cracks at the rim which have been attributed to 
thermal cycling. These cracks usually start on the upstream face where the tem-
perature gradient Is the. greatest. When stress concentrations are present, these 
cracks start in the region of stress concentrations as shown in Fig. 22. Here 
the stress concentrations we;e In the form of pin holes used for bucket retention. 
the case of inner liners, very high temperature gradients also ex-
1st under steady state operating conditions as shown in FIg. 23. Note that a tem-
perature difference of'700°F per inch exists In some regions in th circumferen-
tial direction. These gradients result in local distortion and plastic flow which 
after repeated cycling produce cracking. 	 --
In the case of nozzle vanes, there are several problems: first, adja-. 
cent nozzle vanes do not operate at the same temperature, and, secondly, within 
a given nozzle vane high temperature gradients exist. Fig. 2t shows the . tempera-
ture distribution In adjoining nozzle vanes of an engine using individual combus-
tion cans. Note that thosé.nozzles nearthe center of a given combustor operate 
at a temperature as machas ).00°F higher than the nozzles near the junction be-
tween two combustor outlets. Thus when all äf these nozzles are attached to the 
same inner and outer rings, , the differential expansion of adjacent nozzles can 
cause distinct buckling and cracking, both of the nozzles and of the rings. These 
were 'commonly observed in ' our statistical study of several jet engine failures. 
Even 'within a given nozzle vane,' 'the temperature in adjoining' areas can vary ap-
preciably. Fig. 2S shows typical temperature distributions in a nozzle vane and 
it is 'seen that 'there 1s a' '300F difference dthin' the trailing 'edge region of 
•	 '	 :.	 •	 .	 ''s'	 '?	 '._	 •	 ''.	 •	 ' ''''	 '''	 :	 •
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this nozzle. In the transient condition, even higher temperature gradients can 
be obtainied. The differential expansion of idjacent parts and the constraint 
imposed by the cooler part on the nozzle causes compressiveplastic flow, re-
sidual tensile stress, and ultimate cracking as in the case of the turbine disk. 
In the turbine bucket, the thermal stresses during normal steady state 
operation are not high In all cases, but high stresses can be developed In the 
transient state. 
	
•	 A recent NkSA investigation (ref. 16) was conducted to determine the 
relative importance on thermal stress fatigue of the starting, the steady state 
operation and the shutdown process in a typical turbojet engine. It was found 
	
•	 that by far the most detrimental factor was the start. Fig. 26 shows the temper-
	
•	 ature distribution in the leading edge area during a normal start. A temperature 
difference of 8IiOF was observed within a i/ti inch dimension. The thermal stresses 
associated with such a temperature distribution greatly exceed the elastic.limit 
for the material and cause plastic flow of the material; cracking occurs after rel-
atively few cycles. Fig. 27 shows typical cracks observed after several cycles of 
start-stop operation. The cracks have been brought out for visual emphasis by 
	
•	 Zyglo. Although stting was the prima factor leading to cracking, steady state 
operation hastened the process, thus indicating the desirability of maintaining 
low steady-state centrifugal and thermal stresses as well as low transient therm-
al stresses. 
One obvious solution to failures involving thermal distortion and ther-
mal fatigue is to minimize the temperature and the temperature gradients, for ex-
ample, by using morQ. gradual and controlled starts. 
In the engine study of themal stress fatigue previously mentioned (ref. 
16) an attempt was made to determine the potential increase in life of the buck-
ets to be derived by controlling the temperature surges during start. A special 
fuel distributing valve was designed which supplied fuel to each combustor noz-
• zle in sequence, thus permitting successive ignition of the individual combustors. 
A comparison of the exhaust gas temperatures for the gradual start and the normal 
start is shown in Fig. 28. , No failure was induced on the buckets after 900 cycles 
of starting and stopping whereas 8 normal start-stop cycles were sufficient to 
cause ci ,ack formation. Thus it would appear that in any application not involving 
an urgent need for rapid starting can well take advantage of some technique of 
this type for limiting the rate of tempe rature build-up during the most critical 
portion of the cycle -- at least from the viewpoint of thermal stress fatigue. 
Gradual starts probably would have relatively little beneficial effect 
on the significant thermal gradients in the disk because of its high thermal in-
ertia. As already indicated in Fig. 20, the maximum temperature differential be-
tween the center of the disk and the rim does occur during the transient period 
although it requires several minutes after the engine has reached steady state 
full power operation for the worst condition stresswise to build up. Recognizing,. 
however, that the stress condition at the equilibrium steady state condition Is 
lower than in the transient period, then It would appear fruitfulto examine the 
possibilities for reducing the transient stresses. As seen in Fig. 20, the rim 
reaches almost its maximum temperature very early after start because of its ex-
posure to the hot gases. . The higher temperature differentials during the early 
period arises because the masaive central region has high thermal Inertia and 
because heat arrives to It largely by conduction from the rim. It must be main-
tained at a relatively low temperature because of Its proximity to the bearings.
I f
/
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But since, in this case, It ultimately reaches a temperature of . Li50 0F anyway, it. 
might be desirable to hasten achievment of this temperature thereby reducing the 
temperature differentials. One possible approach (although difficult to control) 
for achieving a more rapid increase in center temperature is to incorporate a sys-
tern which will actually direct some of the hot combustion gas in this region dur-
ing the early period after starting. By such an approach it may be possible to 
maintain the thermal stresses during the transient equal to or lower than those 
during the steady state condition. An approximate calculation based on the plas-
tic flow Induced by each of the two temperature distributions in Fig. 20 indi-
cates the increase in thermal stress cycling life would be by a factor of . 
Constraints must also be minimized if the detrimental effects of ther-
mal stress are to be avoided. For example, the free floating design in nozzle 
vanes arranged such that adjacent nozzles can be expanded independently and the. 
rings can expand independently of the vanes can help appreciably in reducing the 
thermal cracking problems. Provision of bellows between various parts to allow 
relative motion between them when temperature differences occur, Is of further 
help in reducing thermal cracking.
	
. 
Designing for low operating stress, as in the case of centrifugal stress 
in the turbine bucket, is of value in minimizing the danger due to thermal cracks, 
since such cracks will progress slowly in the absence of high operating stress and 
might therefore more readily be detected prior to catastrophic failure. Stress 
concentration should be avoided. For example, in the case of the turbine disk 
with the pin hole cracks previOusly discussed, elimination of these pin holes and 
utilization of another form of! bucket retention can appreciably increase the life 
of the disk.	 ---.., 
The use of materials with good thermal cycling characteristics should 
also be of great assitance. Fig. 29 shows, for example, the results of endurance 
tests on a number of materials conducted by Haythorne (ref. 17). In these tests, 
a cylinder was subjected to flame impingement in a local section and the number. 
of cycles to failure was observed. . Inconel, which has very poor conductivity, 
survived very few cycles. Copper alone, which has good conductivity and there-
fore resulted in lower temperatures and lower temperature dIfferenes between the 
hot and cooler sections, did nt produce a greatly increased life because copper 
is not very durable under the temperatures involved. However, when the copper. 
was clad with Inconel to avoid oxidation and exposure to the hot gases, the life 
was greatly increased. Thus, the use of sandwich materials which -ivay have appli-
cation for sheet metal parts such as combustor liners may In some cases greatly 
increase life. The practical difficulties such as:protecting cut edges of sand-
wich materials must, however, be recognized where oxidation Is critical. 
From an operational standpoint, thermal cracks in some components are 
not quite as serious as other types of failures because they progress fairly slow-
ly and in many cases may be detected prior to catastrophic failure. Thus, peri-
odic inspection and replacement should .assist in coping with the deleterious ef-
fects of thermal cracks. Knowing where tb look for the cracks is an important 
consideration. For,
 example, in one turbine type, we found that cracks originated 
in a region of the rim which was hidden when the bucket was in place. Thus, such 
cracks passed undetected in inspection when the. bucket was not removed. When the 
possibility of such cracks was pointed out, buckets were removed to facilitate 
inspection and it was found that a large percentage of disks that would previous-
ly have passed the inspection were rejected when the inspection was properly made. 
Thus, experience and laboratory tests should act as a guide for intel].igent in-
spection. Inspection should also be scheduled on a contingency.'basis. Rot
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starts, for example, involve higher temperature gradients as previously indicated. 
Greater susceptibility to thermal cracking would be expected±f the number of hot 
starts were large. It would therefore seem reasonable to schedule such inspec-
tions after a certain number of hot starts. The adoption of a replacement sched-
ule based on experience and laboratory and engine tests would be very helpful in 
avoiding failure in operation from thermal distortion and thermal fatigue... 
Stress Corrosion 
A number of other failure mechanisms were determined to be of impor-
.tance for some components. Stress-corrosion was important, for example, in com--
pressor blades when a particular material and heat treatment was used. This con-
dition was one of intercrystalline cracking resulting from stress (particularly 
residual stresses associated with fabrication and heat treatment) and moisture 
(particularly salt water). It appears, however, that this type of failure mech-
anism can be minimized by proper heat treatment to relieve the residual stresses 
and to soften the material but by a sacrifice in tensile strength and endurance 
limit From an operational standpoint, it is important to provide properinspec-. 
tions to insure that defective material, or improperly heat treated material, 
does not inadvertently enter the scene. 
Overtemperature	 . . 
Overtemperature resulting either from hot starts, drift or improper 
setting of the controls, fuel nozzle blockage and carbon formation in the corn-
• bustor, inability of the control to account for altitude or inlet air distor-. 
tion, and failure of cooling .
 systems, has been a serious source of component 
failure. Although overtemperature may last for only a short. period of time, 
the effects may be great. Some components, such as the turbine buckets, may 
operate at the limit of their temperature capabilities, and increases.in tern-... 
perature even when stresses are low can produce detrimental changes in•metal-
lurgical structure and greatly reduce life. An obvious measure of relief is. 
to minimize those conditions known to introduce overteniperature. In the case 
of the controls, it would be highly desirable to develop a temperature sensing 
element and associated contrl equipment of high reliability. . 
Fuel Control System Malfunctions 
The fuel 'control system is responsible for more flight accidents than 
any other engine component. The largest percentage of the difficulties in the 
control system arise from failure of a system component. This fact has already. 
been indicated in the section entitled "TJnderdesign and. Defects.in
 Materials 
and Manufacture." 
Difficulties from the control system also arise from the inability of 
the control system to adequately protect the engine in all,ôf the flight, condi-
tions encountered. Following are someof the problems. 
Overtemperature during starting of engine. •- Many fuel systems depend 
on pilot control during starting .to prevent overtemperature. incorporation of 
a reliable gas temperature senser and associated .
 control equipment, or possibly 
an accurate. fuel, flow scheduling mechanism, would handle this problem.,. ': 
___	 .:......	 ____
-lIi-- 
Overtemperature at maximum thrust, - Many control systems are regulated 
at maximwn thrust by a maximum speed governor on the assumption that if rpm is 
held constant, then gas temperature remains constant. This is approximately cor-
rect for altitudes from sea level to about 3S,000 feet. Above 3S,000 feet, the 
gas temperature increases appreciably with altitude in spite of the fact that the 
engine speed is held constant. The temperature senser is hence needed for this 
condition also. 
Surge during acceleration. - Most control systems provide some control 
of fuel flow during acceleration to avoid compressor stall. In most cases the 
control is not adequately responsive to all of the conditions encountered by the 
engine. In particular, it is difficult to provide adjustments for change in the 
surge limits of an engine caused by change in distortion of the air flow pattern 
at the engine inlet associated with change in flight conditions, The engine surge 
limits also change when the fuel flow rate is rapidly oscillated while "jockeying" 
the engine in a landing or air refueling maneuver. A device that sensed incipient 
surge would simplify the problem of surge prevention over the complex range of 
conditions encountered. 
Flameout. - Most control systems contain some provision for limiting the 
minimum fuel flow rate to avoid flameout. Improvement of controls more accurately 
to follow the variation of flameout conditions with flight conditions is required. 
Improvement of the fuel spray and combustion characteristics at low fuel rates 
would widen the range of engine operation and help alleviate the flameout problem. 
-	 Foreign Object Damage 
By far the most important environmental factor leading to premature en-
gine removals has been the ingestion of foreign objects. Fig. 30 shows a break-
down of the foreign objects identified in one type of jet engine. The outstand-
ing entry in this table is the "unknown" category, which for this engine is 69%, 
and for other engines is even higher. The known objects can further be classi-
Lied as:
a. Parts and metallic debris left in the inlet by manufactur-
\	 ing, maintenance and operating personnel; 
b. Objects originating from internal failures, such as rivets, 
screws, failed screens, combustor liner fragmentssand noz-
zie diaphragm fragments; 
c. Ground debris; 
d. Airborne debris such as hail, flak, birds, etc. 
A recent study at the NASA (ref. 18) has indicated that under certain atmospheric 
conditions vortices can be created, 'and that pre ssure conditions associated with 
the vortex can cause ground debris, such as pebbles, to be projected upward and 
finally sucked into the engine. The condition for such ingestion is made especial-
ly favorable if the pebble is lodged in a crack and. its. lateral motion is constrain-
ed. The presence of 'such vortices, and their, role . in inducing ingestion o ground 
debris, may be a significant factor in explaining the large incidence of foreign 
object damage.	 .
- 15 - 
Since ingestion of ground debris would seem to be an important factor, 
the height of the inlet from the ground would be expected to affect significantly 
the probability of foreign object ingestion. Fig. 31 shows the effect of inlet 
height on-percent of engines damaged by foreign objects. There does appear to be 
a correlation - the greater the height, the less the probability of damage. 
There is also a large difference in the amount of foreign object damage 
occurring on the same engine used in the same aircraft but operated at different 
air bases as shown in Fig. 32. This result indicates that airport cleanliness 
may be a very important factor. 	 - 
-	
- The inlet screen is frequently relied upon for prevention of foreign 
object ingestion. Fig. 33 shows the effect of screen mesh size on the effective-
ness of reducing foreign object damage, When used in the same engine, the screen 
• with 1/16 inch wire spacing was better than twice as effective as the screen with 
• the 1/h inch wire spacing. It is also significant, however, that the coarser 
screen was not well fitted to the inlet, and objects of appreciable size may have 
entered the engine in the space between the screen and the inlet. 
The study also indicated that the more rugged centrifugal engines were 
- less susceptible to premature overhaul and to accident resulting from foreign ob-
- - ject damage than engines of the axial flow type. In the axial flow engines, the 
• damage-was usually sustained by the compressor blades. In the centrifugal en-
gines, foreign objects, when they were damaging, affected mainly the hot section 
of the engine, although disassembly records showed some damage to the compressor 
as-well.	 -	
- 
Since some of the foreign objects that cause damage in passing through 
- -
	
the engine -originate within the engine, or are accidentally introduced, it Is im-
-portant to emphasize cleanliness of design and care during maintenance. The use 
- of 'screws or nut and bolts in locations where they can loosen and pass through 
the engine should be avoided. Repair practices must include a careful inspection 
c -to insure that, no foreign matter such as fasteners, or even tools, are removed - 
before returning the engine to service. However, since most of foreign objects 
- enter thó, engine through tke inlet, it is important to -consider: 	
'•. - : - ': --
a. , - Methods of avoiding Ingestion; 	 - 
-	 - ' -'	 b. - Methods of Identifying the nature of the foreign tter ' - 
'--" - -' " as a guide to instituting the proper features that will - 
-	 reduce ingestion; 
..3. Methods of evaluating damage to act as a guide to deci-
-	
•sions regarding the need to repair oi replace damaged 
-	
-	 parts. 
Regarding the ingestion problem, two basic approaches are possible: 
(1) prevent objects from reaching inlet, and (2) prevent objects which do reach 
the inlet from entering by the use of a screen. Cleanliness of airfields , and 
runways would therefore appear to be of considerable importance. The finding 
of the significance of vortices (ref. 18) on-the ingestion of foreign objects 
would appear- to point to a- need for methods which have a spoiling effect on such 
vortices. A recent study by the-Douglas Aircraft Company (ref. 19)-has indicat-
- ed-the 'potential of a "blowaway" jet or 'aerodrnamic screen" for this purpose. 
It consists of a jet of air-located near the inlet of the engine arid directed in 
such a manner as to tend to, Inhibit the formation of the inlet-induced vortex. - 
•--•-	 -------
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Preliminary tests have shown considerable promise, but it has not as yet been 
tested extensively in service. 
Although it appears that the use of effective screens can appreciably 
reduce the problem of foreign object damage, it should be emphasized that a num-
ber of problems must be solved in connection with the use of screens. Screens 
produce a loss of thrust and may choke the inlet under icing conditions. In an 
effort to avoid icing, some screens are made retractable, but retraction of the 
screen may cause ôollected debris to be dumped into the inlet. Thus, these prob-
lems associated with screens must first be solved before screens can be regarded 
as effective. The use of a run-up screen on the ground during idling and 'linmedi-
ately -prior to take-off would, however, aid as a practical approach. Such screens 
-can be made as rugged as necessary, and do not involve choking, icing or damping. 
Practical methods should be developed for extending its use as far into the take-
off operation as possible. 	 -	 - 
Regarding the identification of the foreign objects, attention should 
be directed to a recent study (ref. 20) in which an emission spectroscopic meth-.. 
od was devised to identify the chemical composition of these objects from the 
trace of material left behind on the damaged blade. This method can be further 
developed and can be of considerable assistance in providing clues for the source 
of the objects. The proper approaches for elimination of these sources may be-
come more evident once the sources have been identified. 
The development of guides to practices regarding the retention or re-
placement of parts damaged by.
 foreign objects is an extremely important matter. 
The most importantly affected parts are the rotor blades in the early stages of 
the compressor. When the damage is severe, there is no question regarding need 
for replacement. It is when it consists of nicks or dents that a difficult de-
cision ' must be.made. It is natural to desire to replace all affected blades, but. 
costliness points to a need for procedures for determining when, replacement is 
really necessary. This sul4ect has been studied to a limited extent by NASA, and 
the results are reported in references 21 and 22. In the latter report a 'specific 
procedure is outlined which can be of assistance to the user of a given engine to 
determine a reasonable replacement policy for nicked compressor blades of his en-
gine. The approach is basedon the following considerations: 
.1 (a) Only-damages which would actually reduce the life under the vi-
bratory conditions likely to be encountered in the engine require.replacement. 
Thus it is first necessary to determine the stress distribution in the blade dur-
ing vibration and in the absence of nicks. Under normal conditions, if the blade 
is to fatigue at all, it will fail at the location where the stress so determined 
is the highest. This is called the critical point. If a nick is introduced, it 
will be damaging only if the stress concentration due to the nick,. together with 
the nominal stress (in the unniked condition) at the location of. the nick, causes 
a higher stress than is normally present at the critical point. Thus, for example, 
if the nick occurs in the outer Sc '(approximately) of the blade span, it usually 
will not, move the failure location fromthe, normal critical point, to its.own loca-
tion.	 .	 . . 
(b) The stress-concentrating factor, of the nick must be considered in 
conjunction with the amount of vibration encountered under the , worst conditions 
in engine-use. If' the vibratory stress is low, then even serious nicks can be 
tolerated. Thus the method involves an engine vibration study during which vi-
brations can readily be measured by means of strain gages i... ;,i 	 '. ;.. - ,.. 
-	 ,,	 ,.	 -	 •'..:"	 . 
'
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(c) Re-working the damages -- that is straightening dents and filing 
or stoning the nicks to reduce stress concentrations -- is frequently adequately 
effective in removing their deleterious effects. A simple method is outlined for 
evaluating specific engines. 
It thus appears that foreign, object damage can be alleviated to some 
extent by the use of.rugged engines, high air-inlet heights above the ground, by 
paying attention to manufacturing, maintenance, and operation to avoid left-over 
debris, by following good practices in air base construction and maintenance of 
cleanliness and possibly by the use of vortex inhibitors during ground operation. 
Development 'of rugged and effective inlet screens may be required or perhaps. in-
• ertial -separation devices instead of screens in which such problems as icing and 
thrust loss are properly handled. Ground run-up screens can possibly be' very ef-
• fective in preventing ingestion during ground operation where the danger of such 
ingestion is the greatest. If ingestion is found as a common occurrence, astudy 
by emission spectroscopy to determine the type of objects ingested can prove help-
ful in suggesting remedial measures. The damaging effects of any nicks and dent8 
so incurred should be evaluated by available methods -- and indeed the methods 
should be extended -- before adopting a final policy on blade replacement. 
'FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPME]

OF INSPECTION AND MkINTENANCE PROCEDURE 
In our study of failure mechanisms it has been made clear:that engine 
failure results from failure of any one of many components and that the individu-' 
al lives of these components can vary greatly. Thus, it is desirable tO think
	 / 
in terms of the lives of the individual components rather than the engine as a 
whole. Two approaches are obviously possible for avoiding accident due to part 
failure '-- (1) the part, should be designed and operated in such' a manner that 
maximum life will be achieved under the conditions that must be met, and (2) the'. 
part must be replaced at the-end of its useful life. The first consideration has 
already been briefly discussed in the section on "Mechanisms of Failure" where 
optimum design and operating practices were outlined. It remains now to discuss 
the replacement problem.	 ,	 S 
The development of a program that will lead to optimized replacement 
practices s urgent if conditions of safety are to be kep compatible with eco-
nomic considerations. Thus, a rational approach would yield largedividends. 
An unusual opportunity is presently afforded by the introduction of a large num-
ber of virgin engines into service which will be operated at utilization factors 
heretofore rare on such engines. The flying hours per day of commercial jet en-
gines can be expected to be S to 10 times as great as' those of military engines.. 
Thus a great deal can be learned even in the first year of operation that has not 
as yet been possible from examination of military records. Furthermore, it is 
urgent that this information be learned since otherwise commercial engines will 
soon be flying in a time range where prior experience is lacking. Since the en-
gines are virgin, ,
 the opportunity exists to develop meaningful records unobscured'. 
bya prior replacement history of unknown extent. The object of this section is,, 
to outline very briefly the 'factors that should be considered in the development
	 ' 
of-a program that could be undertaken which would ultimately lead to' rational 
procedures for engine inspection for part replacement purposes. -
	 ,'. - 
• 	
•- - 	
•.	 • 	 ' 	 S	
•.:' ;,
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Desired Data 
Any program of part replacement must necessarily be based 'on statisti-
cal data on part failures. It is important that these data be obtained and in-
terpreted in the proper'inanner. For example, as already indicated, it cannot be 
based on statistics of only the engines found at the overhaul base, since such 
statistics ignore the engines which have not as yet failed. Neither should It at-
tempt to consider all the engines in service since it would then be necessary to 
await equal degree of.service on all engines before meaningful results are ob-
tained. 'The most practical approach is to consider only those engines which have 
• actually achieved a given life up to the beginning of a given time period, say 
100 hours. The fraction of àuch engines that fail in the 10' hour interval, say, 
"between 100 and 110 hours, 'is then plotted at the middle of the time Interval 
• (lOS hours), 'as in Fi'g. 3t. These plots are called "probability of failure 
'curves", and may fall into three categories as noted on the figure. 	 ''• 
(a) The first curve shows "wearout" or time-dependent failure. Time 
• ', dependent failure results from depletion of some material or property of the corn-
'ponent that is essential to its proper operation. The depletion process may oc-
cur through abrasion, corrosion, or through the "using up" of life as in stress-
rupture or fatigue. The probability of failure increases with age. An example 
- of time-dependent failure is the failure of turbine buckets by stress rupture 
(see FIg. 8).	 r 
(b) Chance or time-independent failure results unpredictably from en-' 
-vironmental causes. The fundanental characteristic of chance failures is that, 
for fixed environment, .conditidns, the hazard of a failure-causing condition is 
equally likely during equal times in the operating period, i.e., the probability 
of failure is independent of operation time. An' example of chance failure is 
damage resulting froifl' foreign objects coming into the engine inlet. A foreign• 
object ie;equally likely to enter the inlet at any time in the life span of the 
.engifle.	 '.	 '	 '	 ' ---
'(c)' Initial failure results from the fact that a component is. defec-
tive at the time it is first put into operation. Such defects result, for ex-
ample, from',errors in manufacture or from the pre-use environment such as damage 
in storage1,' transit,' or handling. 
A complete engine could be expected ,to show a failure rat curve result-
ing from a combination of these three curves (Fig. 35). "Thigs" in a new engine 
might 'be expected to cause a high initial failure rate. Some components will fail 
as a 'result of variations in their environment (e.g., foreign object damage to the 
compressor or occasional severe overteinperature effects on turbine buckets) result-
ing in an element of chance appearing in the engine failure rate curve. 'After 
some time," enough components may show. a time-dependent curve to reflect a' gradual-
ly Increasing failure rate with tixn& . for the engine.	
•• 
Significance of Failure Curves 
•	 Figs.' '314 and 35 show why it is desirableto 'consider individual compo-
nents rather than'the engine 'as a whole. Fig. .35' is an agglomeration of , several 
factors, and therefore points neither to the specific component that must be con-
sidered, nor how to consider any' one component. When plots are made for each 
component, the results are likely to look like one of the three curves shown in 
Fig. ,31i. Once the shape of the curve is determined, the manner of coping with 
the problem from a replacement standpoint becanes clear. 	 '	 • ,
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(a) If the curve is of the initial failure type, little is required 
from a replacement policy standpoint except, of course, to replace the defective 
parts. Proper testing or green-running should reduce the probability of initial-
ly defective components from being put into service. 
(b) With chance failure, a new component is as likely to fail as an 
old one, and 'nothing can be gained by scheduling replacements or by preventive 
maintenance. The failure rate can be reduced only by making the component bet-
ter able to withstand the environment or by reducing the severity of the envi-
ronment.
To ensure flight safety, critical components that fail by the chance 
law must not fail suddenly or catastrophically. They must be caused to finally 
fail by a slow progression of a detectable incipient defect and the time from 
incipient failure to final failure must be greater than the time between compo-
nent inspections so that defects can be found and the part replaced. This Is 
essentially the "fail-safe" concept that has been given so much publicity for 
aircraft structures. (This concept is, of course, desirable for components that 
fail by "wear-out" as well.) Steps can be taken in the design of engines to en-
sure a "fail-safe" condition for most turbine engine components. For example, 
it has been found that as a rule turbine buckets designed for a stress-rupture 
life several times the required life will propagate cracks resulting from ther-
mal fatigue very slowly whereas buckets designed for a much shorter stress-
rupture life propagate any cracks to failure so rapidly that normal inspection 
periods are much too long to catch incipient failures. 
•	 (c) With ti.me-dependent failures, a grace period is possible before 
failure begins and replacementscan be scheduled; thus, It is necessary to de-
termine the actual grace period for each part as a basis for replacement sched-
ules. It now becomes-necessary to determine how best to determine the grace pe-
riod' for each part.
Development of Data 
•	 The development ofthe necessary data to determine the nature of the 
failure curve for a given part is a continuous process that can, in many cases, 
best be a?hieved by a cooperative effort between the manufacturer and the user 
of the engine. For safety reasons, it is obviously desirable not to operate an 
engine in service in a time range In which no previous experiencets available. 
Test stand operation, perhaps conducted by the engine manufacturer, can serve 
the purpose of staying timewise ahead of service, The records obtained from the 
test stand engines can then be-combined with servlce.records in a three-prong 
approach as follows: 
(a) A group of new model engines should be tested in sea-level stands, 
accumulating operating time so as to have perhaps SOO hours more on critical com-
ponents thanthe oldest engines in service. In NASA sea-level test stands, fail-
ure mechanisms observed in turbine disks, buckets, compressor blades, nozzle 
vanes, combustion liners, etc. of service engines (certainly those that were time-
or cycle-dependent) have been consistently duplicated. In one case a- particular 
service failure was not demonstrated but this was found to result from an unusual 
altitude stall condition that caused actual melting of the turbine buckets of the 
particular engine. Once a failure mechanism has been identified in a ground test 
engine, other ground engines can be Inspected at short intervals to search for 
first signs of failure and methods of detecting these failures by inspection. A 
major part of inspection is to know precisely what one is looking for and where 
to look.	 •	 -	 .•	 -
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An example of this latter fact was described earlier where it was indi-
cated that regular wheel inspections were not catching the incipient failures be-
cause the inspectors were not looking in the correct place. By repeated careful 
examinations of laboratory engines, it was found that if the buckets were removed 
and the serrations zygloed, incipient failures could be found in the serration,s 
at the central plane of the disk. Re-examination of disks in service using the 
correct inspection procedure revealed large numbers of Incipient failures and un-
doubtedly saved many lives and much valuable equipment. 
The time for first occurrence of failures could be established from 
the ground engines and removal of these parts from flight engines could be sched-
.uled. If the failures had been a result of a chance mechanism, the time from in-. 
cipient failure ,to fracture could be determined and inspection periods for flight 
engines scheduled to be •a much shorter period to ensure that in-flight failures 
did:not occur.	 ..	 . 
This practice of continuing to operate ground test engines always In 
advance of flight engines has been used for at least two engine models, but Is 
not at this time a general practice. 
(b) When new engines are put into service, they should be completely 
disassembled at regular intervals for inspection so that incipient failures can 
be found. This Information will superimpose the effect of the flight environment 
on the date of component failure rates obtained from ground test engines described 
in "a".	 / 
A possible .approac}i might be as follows: When the first group of en-
gines reach, say, 800 hours, they should be disassembled, andinspected for in-
cipient component failures. If no incipient failures are observed, :
 the engines 
can be re-assembled and replaced In service. The next inspection might be sched-
uled at 900 hours. Usually it will be a different group of engines that will 
reach 900 hours first. If,-however, the already-inspected engines reach 900 
hours first, and if for any reason it is not deemed desirable to disassemble the 
same engines again, they can be set aside until the 900 hour limit is reached by 
another group. When a group, of engines has satisfactorily passed the 900 hôur 
test, all engines may be taken to this time limit. The process can be repeated 
at perhap 100 hour intervals.
	 . 
When incipient failures are found, the defective part hould be re- .. 
placed and a careful record kept of the critical components that have been re-
placed. If experience with the test-stand engines indicates that the Incipient 
failure will progress very slowly, and when failure does occur it will not be 
catastrophic, then judgment can be applied and the defective part might be per-
mitted continued operation. In such cases, however, more frequent inspections 
may be needed to determine the progress of the failure. 
(c) Continuing records of aU,. replacements must be kept in order to 
insure knowledge of the actual service life,of each part is known. If an engine 
is overhauled at say, 1000 hours, and the disk not replaced because it appears 
In good condition, it cannot be assumed that the disk will last another 1000 
hours if that Is the time until the next overhaul. When the service life of. 
each critical component is known, the record of actual service time of a spe-
cific part has direct meaning in establishing a time ..for engine removal and 
part replacement.
.
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Application of Data 
As already indicated, one of the principal reasons for a test-stand - 
and service -evaluation program is to establish part replacement schedules. Al-
though it may be desirable in some cases to remove an engine from service in 
order to replace a single component, it might be recognized that economic con-
siderations will not permit disassembly and replacement on an individual part 
basis. The concept of "engine overhaul" will probably have to be retained, but 
the time for such overhaul and the parts to be replaced can be chosen on a ra-
tional basis. In addition to setting overhaul times, the records of such. a pro-
gram, together with supplementary studies as outlined below, would lead to a num----
ber of.inter-overhaul inspections as follows: 
(a) Inspection schedule on time basis. - For some of the failures the 
time from first indication of failure to final failure can be sufficiently long. 
that inspections may be scheduled to detect the difficulties. In this category
	 . -
come such items as wear of bearings; thermal cracking of combustor liners and 
transition pieces, and turbine disk rims, nozzles arid buckets. The records will - 
indicate how often such inspections, should be made, where to look for failures, - 
and which incipient failures can be tolerated until the next regular inspection
	 . - 
period. In the case of foreign objects which occur unpredictably, and with pos-
sible catastrophic consequences, every effort should be made to check for evi- --
dence of damage on a preflight basis. When extensive inspection of the compres-
sor blades ' for foreign-object damage is impractical, a limited inspection, in-
volving the screen and the early compressor stator and rotor stages, may be 
feasjb1e without disassembly a!nd may greatly reduce the probability of a failure 
from this source.	 -..	
-. / 
- (b) Inspection schedule on basis of contingency. - In this category 
comes failures which may be considered accidental. Very rapid deterioration of. 
the life of the components in the hot end of the- engine can result from overtem-
perature or overspeed. Inspection of the parts in the hot end of the engine 
should be made when overtemperatures and overspeeds of prescribed intensity and - 
number have been experienced as is the practice in military service. The report-. 
ing of these incidents is -currently left to the pilot. An automatic recorder 
which gives the temperature and rpm as a function of time would provide a much 
more accurate basis for scheduling inspections. Not only the mean. combustion -. 
gas teinperture but also abnormal distributions in temperature should be mdi- - 
cated.	 -	 .	 . 
Inspection of the turbine disk should also be made when there is mdi- ',: 
cation of difficulty with the turbine wheel cooling system. Evidence of èxces-
- 
s±ve rim growth and changes in hardness and microstructure may be used as mdi
-
cations of deterioration. Inspection of the bearings and the lubrication system 
should be made when there is evidence of lubrication-system failure, e.g., when 
excessive amounts of foreign particles are detected in the oil filters. 
(c) Inspections based on indications of abnormal operation . - Consid-
erable attention should be directed toward the development of methods and devices 
that will warn of impending component failure. Particularly useful would be meth-
od8 of checking internal parts without disassembly of the engine between regular 
inspections. - Some possibilities along these lines such as monitoring instrwnenta-
tion in the control lubricant, - fuel and turbine cooling systems to warn the pilot 
of. ..trouble in these - systems were indicated in the text of the initial NASA report. - 
..	 .	 .	 -
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Three specific methods (described in ref. 23) have been developed by the Directo-
rate of Flight Safety Research, Office of The Inspector General, USAF. They were. 
able to cite examples where theàe measurements would have predicted engine fail-
ure. The methods are: 
(a) Noting either increases or decreases in a continuous record of jet 
engine oil consumption. Increase in oil consumption might reflect seal leakage, 
breather or vent loss, or evaporative loss. Decrease in oil consumption might 
reflect restricted oil jets or oil line deficiency. 	 .	 " 
• " '
	
(b) Noting of a decrease in time for engine coast down. An engine 
which has increased friction would slow from say 6 speed to stop in less time 
than normal. Increaed friction might result from damaged bearings, compressor 
or turbine rotor rub, or failure of installed accessories. 
	
•	 (c) Noting changes of exhaust nozzle condition at maximum power. In 
some engines using an electronically-controlled exhaust-nozzle, the nozzle con-
trol seeks an optimum nozzle postion to maintain a specific average tail pipe 
temperature at 100% rpm. Deviation in engine effectiveness upstream of the noz-
zle will result in the nozzle control stabilizing at a different nozzle position. 
• inlet air temperature also causes a variation in exhaust-nozzle opening and 
changes from this cause must be compensated. 
CONCLUSIONS 
- -'	 in conclusion, our(study has indicated that overhaul times on military 
jet engines at the tixne'the'statistics were compiled were fairly low despite an 
extensive program of field repair. Foreign object damage was the mostimportant 
single. factor 'leading to premature overhaul, affecting mainly the compressor 
blades of the axial flow engine. The compressor, combustor, nozzle assembly, tur-
bine buckets and turbine disks, bearings, and fuel control, were principal compo-
nents in"which early failure was found. The principal failure mechanisms are 
foreign objèct'damage, 'stress rupture, mechanical fatigue, thermal 'distortion and 
thermal 'fatigue, overtemperature, stress corrosion, and fuel-control malfunctions. 
	
-	 In some 'cases faii'ure can be avoided by design and material improve-
ments. I,nother cases failure cannot be avoided, but the time between the ini-
ial appearance of damage and final part breakage is sufficiently 'long: so that the• 
incipient failure is likely to be detected during scheduled peridic inspections 
and overhauls. In this category comes thermal craking of combustion liners and 
nozzle' diaphragms.	 '	 '	 ' 
The most serious types of failures are those in which relatively little 
'warning time is available and in' which accident is, likely when failure occurs. 
Here' the principal ' remedy is to remove the part before its useful life is exhaust-
ed. Periodic replacement of those parts known to have finite life, following a 
schedule guided by laboratory studie"and service experience, may avoid accident 
"in' 'spite of' the Inevitable ,ultimate failure. if use is prolonged. In this category 
comes stress 'rupture' failure of turbine disks and buckets, and fatigue failure of 
bearings.
In those cases where deterioration is a consequence of chance enron-
- mental 'factors,' such as foreign object damage and overtemperature,' inspection up-
'On the: occurreflce of such àontingency must be scheduled to guide part replacement. 
The engine should be de8igned to facilitate such inspection. 
(.)
23 
It should be emphasized that the low lives indicated by the statistical 
study are for military engines in which the press for high performance transcends 
other requirements. The frequency of component failure is closely associated with 
the severity of the operating conditions, and it is possible that considerable in-
crease in life can be achieved by compromises, perhaps small ones, in performance. 
The user must decide on the best compromise between high performance and long 
life. One purpose of our study was an attempt to point out some of the factors 
involved in this compromise.
-	 -	 -
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